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Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a clinical condition that occurs after a discrete traumatic event,
such as an accident or assault. Research into PTSD has primarily been adult-focused; however, there is a
growing body of evidence evaluating the theory and treatment of PTSD in young children. Consequently,
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) interventions for PTSD in youth have been developed that focus on
3 core components of the cognitive model–a disorganized memory of the trauma, maladaptive ap-
praisals of the trauma and its effects (meanings), and dysfunctional coping mechanisms (management).
Here, we describe the extension of this treatment approach (termed CBT-3M) to very young children
(3–8 years) through the case of Dylan, an 8-year-old motor vehicle accident survivor. This serves as an
illustration of the underlying theory and its successful application. Further work is intended to provide
evidence of the efficacy of this treatment via an ongoing treatment trial. C© 2017 The Authors. Journal
of Clinical Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc J. Clin. Psychol.: In Session 73:511–523,
2017.
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Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a condition that occurs in the aftermath of a discrete
traumatic event, for example, an accident, assault, or disaster. PTSD is characterized by dis-
abling symptoms from four clusters; reexperiencing (e.g., flashbacks and nightmares about the
trauma; avoidance (e.g., efforts to not think about or talk about the trauma); negative cogni-
tions and mood (e.g., a persistent and distorted sense of blame of self or others to an inability to
remember key aspects of the event); and hyperarousal (e.g., anger outbursts and hypervigilance
for threat; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th edition [DSM-5]; Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Traumatic events with the potential to lead to PTSD
are experienced by up to two thirds of children by 16 years of age (Copeland, Keeler, Angold,
& Costello, 2007), including in preschool and early school years, even when excluding abuse.
However, the DSM-5 was the first edition to include tailored criteria capturing the differential
presentation of the disorder in very young children younger than 6 years old.
The inclusion of these preschool criteria within the DSM-5 follows work by Scheeringa and
colleagues (e.g., Scheeringa, Peebles, Cook, & Zeanah, 2001; Scheeringa, Zeanah, & Cohen,
2011), who developed an alternative PTSD algorithm for young children. PTSD criteria prior to
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the publication of the DSM-5 had been adult-oriented, leading to an underdiagnosis of PTSD
in youth (Scheeringa, Zeanah, et al., 2011). Scheeringa’s alternative algorithm required only one
symptom from each of the then three symptom clusters in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), thereby
critically reducing the avoidance criterion (the biggest barrier to diagnosis in youth) from three
symptoms to one.
In addition, the alternative algorithm took account of how children’s limited cognitive and
expressive language skills (Scheeringa, Zeanah, Drell, & Larrieu, 1995) constrained their ability
to describe their subjective experiences, with a consequent focus on behavioral markers of
distress.Young children also typically display adifferent range of behaviors than adults, including
increased nightmares not related to the trauma; extreme difficulty falling asleep or frequent night
waking, requiring significant increase in parental involvement; refusal to eat or trouble keeping
food down; and changes in responsiveness to an adult’s attempts to calm them that may include
responding with heightened irritability, fearful expressions, crying, or blank expressions under
circumstances that do not normally produce these effects (that is, face-to-face play or efforts to
comfort; Carpenter & Stacks, 2009).
According to these newcriteria, a significant proportion (10% to 40%)of younger childrenwho
are exposed to nonabuse traumas are severely affected and go on to develop PTSD (Levendosky,
Huth-Bocks, Semel, & Shapiro, 2002; Meiser-Stedman, Smith, Glucksman, Yule, & Dalgleish,
2008). For example, 10% to 14% of 3- to 8-year-old children were diagnosed with PTSD when
assessed with the developmentally appropriate criteria proposed by Scheeringa 6 months after
presenting at a U.K. emergency department after acute trauma (Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008).
There is evidence that if left untreated, PTSD in children and young people can lead to a chronic
course lasting a number of years (Yule et al., 2000). In support of this, 10% to 15% of 3- to
8-year-olds have previously been found to have PTSD 3 years after a trauma, which is in line
with the consensus in the field that chronic PTSD in young children after discrete traumas
shows little spontaneous remission (Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008). Part of the difficulty is that
experiencing trauma at a young age can disrupt typical developmental processes: There may be
increased difficulty coping with frustration, bouts of intense fear, sleep disturbances, regression
in developmental achievements, social withdrawal, and generally higher levels of mood and
behavioral problems in comparison to control groups (Lieberman & Knorr, 2007), any or all of
which can lead to cumulative difficulties if left untreated.
Archetypal PTSD symptoms including intrusions, avoidance, negative mood and cognition,
and hyperarousal after a trauma are considered to be a normal response to an abnormal event;
however, it is the maintenance of such symptoms that characterizes PTSD. There are a number
of theories that attempt to explain how such symptoms coalesce over time to form PTSD. Here,
we focus on the cognitive model (see Dalgleish, 2004) because it forms the theoretical backbone
of our treatment. What follows is a summary of the cognitive model and how it explains the
development and maintenance of PTSD.
Cognitive Theories of PTSD in Adults and Youth
PTSDas ananxiety or stress disorder presents an interesting theoretical challenge. Suchdisorders
are generally seen as the result of misappraisals leading to the interpretation of an imminent or
future threat. However, in PTSD the anxiety concerns a memory of what has already occurred.
How can we resolve this discrepancy? Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that for PTSD to occur,
the individual needs to interpret an element of the traumatic experience as being ongoing––in
that way, it represents a current and future threat. For this to happen, they suggest that two key
processes need to be present:A distorted representation of the trauma memory and its link to other
autobiographical memories; and a pattern of maladaptive appraisals of the trauma or its sequelae.
The sense of current threat is then accompanied by the key symptom clusters of reexperiencing,
avoidance, negative cognitions and moods, and hyperarousal.
A central tenet of cognitive theories of PTSD is that the nature of the trauma memory
is critical to the development of the disorder (Dalgleish, 2004). Those suffering with PTSD
often have difficulty retrieving information about the traumatic event, and the recollection
is often disjointed and fragmented (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). Second, as we have
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seen, survivors often experience high levels of intrusive memories that are emotionally laden.
Cognitive theorists (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996) suggest that this apparent paradox is a function
of two different retrieval pathways of information from the autobiographical memory base.
Intentional retrieval is thought to depend on organized verbal (propositional) representations
of the trauma. Intentional retrieval can therefore be disrupted when the trauma memory is
not sufficiently elaborated and poorly contextualized in time and place. Involuntary intrusive
recollections, in contrast, reflect the operation of sensory-based trauma representations with
minimal propositional content that can be activated by encountering sensory cues reminiscent
of the trauma—triggers–in the environment (Brewin et al., 1996; Dalgleish, 2004).
The second key process Ehlers and Clarke (2000) identify is the presence of maladaptive
appraisals; they suggest that an individual with PTSD is unable to appraise the event and its
implications as time-limited, thus supporting a sense of current threat. These perceived ongoing
threats can be external or internal––for example, the world is a more dangerous place, or altered
beliefs about one’s ability to manage in stressful scenarios. With regard to the traumatic event
itself, common misappraisals may also be external or internal. The individual might make
an overestimation of the prevalence of that event and therefore the perception of future risk.
Consequently, he or she might develop a strategy for managing that risk that actually maintains
the fear via avoidance, for example, avoiding the activity during which the event occurred due
to unrealistic beliefs about the risk of the event recurring. Alternatively, the individual might
believe that because he or she experienced the trauma, and not somebody else, that “bad things
happen to me.”
In terms of appraisals of feelings surrounding the event, it is common for people to develop
thoughts that certain of these emotions (e.g., guilt, shame) confirm that they were in fact
responsible for the event (Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Alternatively, survivors may develop
thoughts about their actions that change their view of their ability to resolve or manage stress; in
other words, not coping with this experience means a fundamental problem with coping exists.
Those with PTSD often see their symptoms as a sign that they have changed or that their
mental health has been permanently affected, rather than viewing these responses as common
and understandable reactions to a stressful event. These appraisals can very often lead to
maladaptive coping strategies.
Those with PTSD will also often interpret others’ actions or signs of support as confirmation
of some internal detriment. For example, those not wishing to discuss the event for fear of
upsetting the victim may have their actions interpreted as a sign of not caring or that the event
was partially the victim’s fault (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Again, such interpretations can lead
to dysfunctional strategies such as social withdrawal or avoidance of conversations, which in
turn can reduce the opportunity for therapeutic reliving or positive feedback to counter these
negative appraisals.
Negative appraisal is associated with certain emotional responses, and Ehlers and Clarke
(2000) go into detail about how perceived danger may lead to augmented fear, violation of
personal rules may lead to anger, and appraisals about responsibility to shame or guilt. It is
acknowledged that a number of negative emotions will occur over time because the appraisals
will be activated in different situations and times and because personal conviction in their
veracity will fluctuate.
There is now a substantive body of research supporting the cognitive model of PTSD in
adults (see Brewin & Holmes, 2003, and Dalgleish, 2004, for reviews). Central to the current
article, Meiser-Stedman has advanced the model for youth (Meiser-Stedman, 2002) using the
core elements that Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) highlight. Subsequently,
there has been a growing research interest examining the cognitive model of PTSD in younger
populations.
For example, in a study of 93 children aged between 10 and 16 years presenting at an emergency
department after either an assault or a motor vehicle accident, Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish,
Smith, Yule, and Glucksman, (2007) found that a diagnosis of acute stress disorder (ASD) was
associated with a greater sense of threat at the time of the trauma, the presence of relatively
more sensory-laden memories of the trauma, and higher scores on a range of trait cognitive
style measures indexing the presence of dysfunctional posttrauma appraisals. The development
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of ASDwas mediated by the presence of more sensory-laden memories and there was a trend for
dysfunctional appraisals to mediate this relationship as well (Meiser-Stedman et al., 2007). This
is important because ASD has the same core symptom clusters of PTSD but is diagnosed within
the first four weeks posttrauma. A follow-up study went on to show that distorted memory
representations and dysfunctional appraisals mediated the development of later PTSD in the
10- to 16-year-olds (Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish, Glucksman, Yule, & Smith, 2009).
Based on these theoretical and empirical evaluations of the cognitive processes implicated
for PTSD in youth, a cognitive therapy intervention tailored for young people –trauma-focused
cognitive therapy (TF-CT)–was developed (Smith, Perrin, Yule, & Clark, 2010). TF-CT focuses
on the three “Ms” the cognitive model highlights as central to PTSD in youth: distortedmemory
representations (memories), maladaptive cognitive appraisals (meanings), and impoverished
coping (management). The first trial to evaluate this age-appropriate version of TF-CT recruited
24 youth between 8 and 18 years of age who metDSM-IV criteria for PTSD after single incident
trauma, and they found that 92% of those who received a 10-week course of TF-CBT no longer
met diagnostic criteria, versus 42% of a waitlist group (Smith et al., 2007). In addition to this,
it was noted that trauma-related misappraisals mediated the effect of TF-CBT relative to the
waitlist control on PTSD in children and adolescents (Smith et al., 2007). A second trial (Meiser-
Stedman et al., in press) replicated these findings in youth across a similar age range but this
time in the acute posttrauma phase.
These two trials in older children of the cognitive approach to intervention (TF-CT) are
encouraging and the results are in line with a broader literature endorsing cognitive-behavioral
approaches (Cary & McMillen, 2012). However, to date, there has been only one small pilot
clinical trial examining any form of CBT in younger children with symptoms, but not a diagno-
sis, of PTSD, in which children were allocated either to receive 12 sessions of manualized CBT
or to a waitlist control group (Scheeringa, Weems, Cohen, Amaya-Jackson, & Guthrie, 2011).
The results of this study, conducted in New Orleans, supported the feasibility and effect of a
developmentally tailored form of CBT, with a large effect size and treatment gains maintained
at the 6-month follow-up. However, it is unclear whether the results from this study are gen-
eralizable, particularly within the United Kingdom, given that the trial was conducted in an
underprivileged, low social-economic group in an urban American setting (Scheeringa, Weems,
et al., 2011 ).
Based on the previous work with children and adolescents, aged 8–17 years, showing that
TF-CT improves symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, and depression, as compared to a waitlist control
group, we adapted this program (Smith et al., 2007; Meiser-Stedman et al., 2016) for use with
much younger children (Dalgleish et al., 2015). Adaptations include the use of cartoons, pictures,
and toys to illustrate the process and develop the narrative. Worksheets also include simplified
concepts, simple language, and child-friendly depictions very young children can understand.
This trial (Dalgleish et al., 2015) is designed to assess the efficacy of this intervention–termed
CBT-3M to reflect the clinical focus on memories, meanings, and management–for children
aged 3–8 years with PTSD after single incident traumas and is being compared to a treatment
as usual (TAU) group. This trial will also assess a child’s willingness to engage in therapy and
undergo this emotionally demanding work.
To illustrate the components of this novel treatment approach, we present a case study of an
8-year-old male survivor of a motor vehicle accident who had a diagnosis of PTSD according
to DSM-5 preschool criteria.
Case Illustration
Presenting Problem and Client Description
Dylan was 8 years of age at the time of treatment. He had been involved in a car crash that
occurred not far from his family home. He was a front-seat passenger in a vehicle driven by his
father, and they were returning home from a soccer practice. At a roundabout, a turning circle
directing traffic through, in this instance, a five-way intersection, Dylan’s father slowed down
for a vehicle already on the roundabout that had right of way, but the vehicle behind them was
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travelling too quickly and did not manage to brake in time and there was a collision. Neither
Dylan nor his father suffered major injuries. Dylan’s father, however, did suffer a minor injury
to his knee after it hit the steering column in the impact. The car Dylan was traveling in was
not structurally damaged, the air bag did not deploy, and the vehicle was driveable immediately
after the event. After the incident, Dylan’s father went to exchange personal and administrative
details with the other driver for the purposes of insurance. The other driver was very angry
with Dylan’s father and a verbal altercation occurred, with the threat of violence. Dylan’s father
climbed back into the car to drive away and they were promptly pursued by the other driver
for a period of time before the other driver pulled off the road, leaving Dylan and his father to
proceed with their journey. The incident was reported to the police when they arrived home.
Dylan and his two older siblings lived with their father, who was sole carer for the family after
his wife left the family home a number of years previously. Dylan was a talented young athlete,
who played soccer for a local team. Dylan’s father had a physical health condition; consequently,
he did not work but was in receipt of a disability living allowance from the state. His father had
no previous history of mental health conditions, though he acknowledged periods of low mood
as a consequence of not working and struggling as a single parent to raise three children.
Dylan was referred a year after the collision through the local Child and Adolescent Mental
Health Service (CAMHS)–the state-funded mental health care service in the United Kingdom.
He presented with intrusive memories of both the crash and the altercation that followed. Dylan
had a very disjointed verbal narrative of the incident and only really understood the end result
of the crash (i.e., the damage to the car and the pursuit home). He was reported to be highly
anxious at reminders of the incident, from talking about it, to the type of vehicle involved, to the
stretch of road, to stories on television with crashes, injuries, or death as part of their content.
Dylan was presenting with great distress at bedtime and was no longer able to go to sleep on
his own, insisting on sleeping in his father’s bed and taking up to a couple of hours to go to
sleep. Nights were frequently disturbed by nightmares, though it was unclear what the content of
these were because they were not normally discussed either at the time or the following morning.
Dylan was showing more physical aggression than prior to the accident, and this manifested
itself both at home and at school. At home, he was frequently getting into fights with his older
siblings and lashing out at the slightest provocation. At school, it had been noted that he was no
longer concentrating on his school work and was failing to complete work, even with assistance.
His frustration with the situation would often lead to outbursts in class, including becoming so
worked up that he began overturning tables and trashing a classroom. No one was hurt in the
incident; he was left in the classroom as his classmates were removed to safety, rather than trying
to isolate him in a distressed state. The school was willing to work with agencies around Dylan
to resolve the situation and address his greater needs at the same time.
With regard to comorbidities as well as PTSD, Dylan met the criteria for attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), conduct disorder (CD),
major depressive disorder (MDD), separation anxiety disorder (SAD), and specific phobia for
spiders. These were all assessed using the Diagnostic Infant and Preschool Assessment (DIPA;
Scheeringa & Haslett, 2010). There had been a long-standing concern over ADHD from before
the event, with information being exchanged between the school and Dylan’s father, and Dylan
had subsequently been referred for assessment in CAMHS specifically for this.
Case Formulation
Havingmet criteria for PTSD on theDIPA, it was clear that Dylan was suffering with intrusions,
avoidance, and hyperarousal as a consequence of the crash. He appeared to have a disorganized
understanding of the event and limited capacity to discuss the crash, especially the emotional
content of the subsequent intrusions. Except for the ADHD and specific phobia, the comorbidi-
ties appeared to have their onset in the weeks after the crash. We hypothesized that these were
due to Dylan’s difficulties with processing his anger and fear and choosing to lash out as a means
to remove himself from feared situations or to prompt contact with his father. For instance, at
school, lashing out often led to him to be picked up early by his father, thereby reinforcing the
behavior and leading to an entrenched avoidance tactic.
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Memory of the trauma 
Disorganised, poorly 
elaborated, missing 
secons 
Meanings 
Concern over father’s 
health, assumpons 
about pain, wanng to 
run away 
Management 
Not talking about it, 
quesons with no 
answers, idealized 
ending, anger & 
outbursts  
Current threat & Symptoms
Intrusions, nightmares, 
hypervigilance, increased 
negave emoons 
Figure 1. Formulation of Dylan’s presentation using the three Ms from the cognitive model of PTSD:
Memories, meanings, and management.
As is normal, the formulation guided the goals of treatment, and we aimed to reduce the cur-
rent threat and symptoms by addressing the threeMs–memories, meanings, andmanagement–of
the trauma in line with the cognitive model of PTSD in youth (see Figure 1). Specifically, goals
of treatment comprised a reduction in the number and frequency of intrusions and nightmares, a
shift in the nature of the appraisals of the trauma (meanings), the adoption of better emotional
management strategies (management), and processing of the trauma (memories). We agreed
with Dylan and his father that the central focus of the therapy would be to develop a memory
narrative by integrating the emotional content of the intrusions and nightmares with the current
fragmented story, while discovering and filling in the blanks (memories), before addressing any
misappraisals about the trauma itself, Dylan’s response to it, or to the consequences arising from
the crash (meanings), and integrating these new insights into the evolving narrative. In parallel,
we would work with Dylan and his father behaviorally to address any remaining management
and coping problems (management).
Course of treatment. The CBT-3M package is a manualized, 12-session protocol that
develops the child’s skills to discuss the trauma and accept the need and validity of those
discussions. As noted, the manual is based heavily on the treatment developed by Smith et al.
(2007) for children aged 8–18 years, but it also incorporates aspects of the treatment devised by
Scheeringa et al. (2007) for children with PTSD aged 3–6 years, for example, the initial work
on understanding, monitoring, and managing emotions. The manual has been adapted to be
developmentally appropriate and consequently there are two versions: one for those children
aged 3–4 years, and one for the older age group aged 5–8 years. Both manuals include the same
treatment stages but are adjusted to be sensitive to developmental ability.
Treatment begins by focusing on engaging the family, encouraging a return to the family’s
pretrauma routine and activity level, providing psychoeducation, and normalizing the child’s
response. Following from this, the child begins work on understanding emotions, discriminat-
ing varying levels of emotional intensity, and learning relaxation and imagery-based anxiety
reduction skills. The majority of the treatment is spent on facilitating sufficient procession and
elaboration of the trauma memory through the development and evolution of a detailed trauma
memory narrative, with a focus on integrating new information so that the memory can be up-
dated. This narrative can be verbal or drawn/painted, or both. The narrative is then organized
and elaborated using detailed questioning and with the help of pictures, drawings, or other
sources, such as toys. Cognitive therapy techniques are used to examine and change maladaptive
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appraisals of the event and symptoms (meanings), although in younger children this mostly
comprises behavioral techniques. Throughout the memory work, the narrative is continually up-
dated with any new information as it becomes available, which assists in modifying maladaptive
appraisals (meanings). A visit to the trauma site or exposure to distressing reminders can be
incorporated if indicated as useful and serve to further modify maladaptive appraisals.
Dylan’s treatment started with an explanation of the treatment rationale, and an introduction
to the core components of CBT-3M. His father joined for a number of early sessions, with the
aim that, as time went on, Dylan and his father would begin to have separate time with the
therapist to address problems, discuss next steps, and deal with their individual responses to
the trauma. Because the efficacy of CBT-3M is being assessed, there is limited focus on working
with the parent for their mental health needs in relation to the trauma; however, there is an
acknowledgement that the parent(s) needs to be prepared for their child’s responses to therapy
and they often need help or guidance as to how to deal with their own symptoms. If there is
clinical need for the parent to have independent therapy as a result of the trauma, then they are
advised, encouraged, and supported to access appropriate services.
The initial sessions included a lot of rapport building and normalizing of the response to
the trauma. A cartoon, depicting a motor vehicle accident, emotional reaction, therapy, and
symptom improvement, was used to normalize the fact that accidents happen, that children get
scared, and that they are seen therapeutically with the aim of promoting symptom reduction.
Dylan and his father were informed that trauma can happen to anyone, child, adolescent, or
adult, and we would all experience some of the symptoms that Dylan was dealing with. These
initial sessions also began the process of discussing the trauma, and it is important in this context
that the child knows she or he has permission from the adult to discuss the trauma, while at the
same time normalizing the discussion of events, emotions, and responses to them. This is also a
useful process in helping the parent to see that the trauma can be discussed safely, calmly, and
without burdening the child.
Dylan came from a home situation that was limited in its discussion of emotions. There was
therefore a lot of work initially about recognizing emotions, expressing emotions, and managing
extreme emotions. To this end, we introducedmethods of relaxation andmanagement, especially
progressive muscle relaxation and the use of mental imagery. This is a very good tool for overall
management of emotion outside of the therapeutic context, but it is also useful in addressing
emotion as it occurs in later therapy sessions when working on the trauma narrative. The
relaxation techniques give the child the experience of paying attention to his or her internal
emotional state and of observing how relaxation techniques cause a change in these emotions.
With the support of the parent, the child is encouraged to use it at home; the parent is also
encouraged to use it with the child, and the child is encouraged to teach others in the family the
technique, thereby instilling a sense of mastery. This is the first homework within the package
of learning and practicing relaxation techniques, and as can be seen from the Gantt chart
(Figure 2), practice continues throughout the treatment process.
Given Dylan’s separation anxiety and the change in his patterns of play to minimize
separation from his father, even within the house, it was deemed important to start in the
initial sessions with reclaiming his life via behavioral activation, in parallel with the primary
focus on memory work. Having socially isolated himself, Dylan was inadvertently reinforcing a
message that the world was different to him before the accident. He was also no longer receiving
important feedback that he could manage situations by himself without the need for protection
from his father. Introducing new activities (behavioral activation) also sent the message that life
continues and that the crash was in the past, beginning the process of creating updatedmemories
postincident.
We therefore scheduled a series of tasks that Dylan and his father could do together, many
of which they were already doing but in response to an anxiety or stimulus. By planning these
activities in advance, Dylan knew he had dedicated time with his father without the need to
compete with his siblings or chores his father needed to do. The first task was simply playing
soccer together in the garden, in the street, and then in the park. The idea was to gradually
expand Dylan’s geographical horizons while also opening him up to spontaneous contact with
his friends. This activity was also important in providing feedback that the pain he experienced
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Figure 2. Gantt chart of treatment elements over the course of sessions.
Note. The Gantt chart is a guide through the stages of treatment; number of sessions for each element is
based on the child’s ability to complete the relevant section. Also, elements are illustrative, for example,
image/nightmare work is required only if clinically indicated.
in the accident was not permanent. He would happily head the soccer ball and experience no
pain or side effects in his neck or shoulders as a consequence of doing so.
A core part of the CBT-3M approach is to use all therapeutic activities to identify dysfunc-
tional meanings surrounding the trauma and its consequences. The behavioral activation work
revealed that part ofDylan’s concern about separating fromhis fatherwas a belief that something
would happen to his father. We addressed this belief by looking together at tasks that Dylan’s
father did and how well he managed them. His father had been in a number of altercations over
many years prior to the crash. However, he had always been able to walk away from the incidents
and we used this fact as an example of his fathers’ skill in looking after himself.
As mentioned earlier, at the start of therapy, there was limited communication involving
pertinent family news, health, or emotions between father and son. With so little spoken about,
there was a lot of uncertainty on both sides, Dylan’s father did not know of his son’s concern for
him nor the content of Dylan’s intrusions and nightmares. Meanwhile, Dylan did not know that
his father’s health problems were in the past. This often led to a pattern of mutual avoidance,
with assumptions that everything was alright or with Dylan filling in blanks. As is often the case,
the blanks were often completed with information that was worse than the truth. Consequently,
work in the session was carried out with the father to manage conversations and open up pre-
viously closed areas. Given the long-standing nature of this pattern (i.e., predating the trauma),
it was hard for Dylan’s father to do this, and these changes needed encouragement and support
over a number of sessions. However, Dylan’s father noticed that, having clarified a few points
with Dylan, his older children had also begun to ask questions around the same topics. This
promoted further discussion and led to a more open pattern of communication overall where
appropriate.
Emerging from this work was the realization that a major worry of Dylan’s was his father’s
ongoing medical condition and the pain his father experienced in the crash. Dylan believed that
his father was still carrying injuries from the trauma and that the consequences of the accident
were greater than he had been lead to believe. We therefore generated a series of questions
that Dylan could ask his father to update his understanding of his father’s condition and of
the effect of the accident. Part of Dylan’s confusion was that–now that he was spending more
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time with his father–he was alert to his father taking medication to maintain his health. He
had thought the medication was linked to the trauma and that the crash had caused his father’s
illness to recur. We were able to introduce the information that his father was actually doing
very well medically but that he required the medication to maintain his health. Dylan asked if
it was like taking hay fever medication, which illustrated his integration of this new knowledge
into his previous knowledgebase and the search for a meaning that was relevant and meaningful
to him. This is an example of using all the information gathered therapeutically to update and
restructure the memory and any dysfunctional appraisals.
Developing the Trauma Narrative
Working on the trauma narrative and associated appraisals took up themajority of the treatment
sessions, approximately eight in total. Over the course of the treatment sessions the rationale for
the trauma narrative was revisited and discussed in relation to therapeutic gains and changes in
understanding of the trauma and its consequences.With a greater level of communicationDylan
seemed more comfortable with both the process and content of the narrative; at the start, he was
reluctant to elaborate on his thoughts or difficulties, but over the course of treatment, he became
more confident and capable in expressing his thoughts especially in integrating new information.
He was given options for writing it, drawing it, or talking it through with the therapist recording
it. He chose the latter, having initially started to write it down but becoming frustrated with
how slow that process was due to his own handwriting. The narrative was recorded verbatim,
and printed up at the end of each session so that the new details were integrated ahead of the
following session. During the recounting of the narrative, Dylan was encouraged to relay his
emotional state using a simple Likert scale of distress: 0 being no distress and 10 being the most
he had experienced.
It was clear from the first narrative, detailed below, that there were deficits around the extent
of his knowledge of the event and his understanding of the outcomes; clearly, too, there were
areas where Dylan’s memory was blank.
Well, erm, it was painful. Then I was frightened. It was really a little bit of a hard
crash. Well, erm, it, erm, it was really, erm, it was like I was going to have to go
to hospital, it literally hurted everywhere. It hit us bad and it looked as if it was to
hit the curb bad too. They got out of the car and it, erm, it, it was like they were
circling round us and looked like they were going to fight, they were using strong
words. It was the first crash I had been in, that is all I can remember.
Together with Dylan we described this first narrative as an incomplete jigsaw puzzle in which
he would need to be a detective to hunt down the missing pieces and identify someone who
would be able to able fill in the blanks. It is useful to illustrate with an example. In his initial
recounting of the narrative–Dylan acknowledged the physical pain as being the worst pain he
had ever experienced, but as is common in rear-end accidents, he was unaware that the impact
was about to happen and the likely impact speed and he did not understand why his father
had been braking and was unaware of the other driver–it transpired that Dylan had interpreted
his injuries, and those of his father, as being serious enough to warrant immediate hospital
treatment. However, he had not received any such treatment and therefore felt that there were
still unresolved physical problems resulting from this omission.
As the blanks in the account were filled in, Dylan was told that his father had slowed for
a vehicle on the roundabout and the vehicle immediately behind that one was an ambulance.
Immediately, on hearing this, Dylan was able to clarify that the ambulance was seen twice,
which his father confirmed. The ambulance crew had witnessed the accident and had proceeded
to go back round the roundabout to see if assistance was required. The ambulance therefore
drove past twice, without stopping, because once the crew was aware that everyone was moving
unaided, they proceeded on with their original duties. The presence of an ambulance in the
vicinity at the time created an assumption in Dylan’s mind that he would need to go to hospital
and therefore that the injuries were very serious. We were therefore able to integrate this new
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information and restructure Dylan’s narrative, inserting information reflecting his new under-
standing that the accident was not serious; otherwise, the paramedics would have stopped,
rather than departed, once they had checked all were well before returning to their original
nonemergency duties.
The following excerpt from the narrative shows its development and elaboration, including
new statements that were integrated after the process exemplified above. One of the techniques
used to integrate new informationwas “what I know now” statements, which help to differentiate
memory recall from updated information and reappraisals.
Dad and I were coming back from football training. I do not know where the other
driver was going, but we were heading home. I was listening to music on the radio
and messing about with Dad’s phone. I let go of the door handle, and then the van
just hit us. It was painful. Everything was painful, especially my neck. I now know
that the pain did not last long, and after a couple of days, it had gone completely.
Dad was hurt; I did not know where he was hurting. I now know that he only
hurt his knee as it banged against the dashboard; I now know that this is fairly
common. Then I was frightened. It was really a little bit of a hard crash. It looked
as if the airbag was going to go off; the airbag did not inflate. Well, erm, it, erm, it
was really, erm, it was like I was going to have to go to hospital; it literally hurted
everywhere. I now know that I thought I would need to visit the hospital due to
an ambulance on the roundabout; however, once it had seen everyone was moving
and okay, it proceeded on its journey. I now know that this is confirmation that no
one was seriously injured, as they would not have driven away if someone needed
help. I now know that my injuries, and my Dad’s injuries, were not severe enough
to need hospital attention. I went to the GPs a few days later and everything was
fine and I needed no physical treatment.
Dylan acknowledged in a later part of his narrative that he had wanted to run away. He felt
he was not too far from his friend’s house and he could have made it there to get help. This was
later appraised as an indication that he was someone who is unable to cope in stressful situations.
It also led to feelings of guilt that he could have gotten help but instead wanted to run away.
Identifying new facts and subsequent appraisals helped explain some of Dylan’s concerns for
his father’s safety. We normalized his thoughts at the time about fleeing as being understandable
in the face of a new experience that was scary and without a known ending. We addressed and
worked on accepting the reality of him as a younger child having no knowledge of such events.
We integrated this new information into Dylan’s narrative along with information about his
father first checking on him and ensuring he was well before exiting the car, the situation coming
to an end, him having reached a place of safety, and all the while his father being able to protect
him and get him there.
Dylan also acknowledged anger that his father had gotten out of the car. He had felt that
his father’s motivation was to fight the other driver and he was worried for his father’s health
and well-being. He had not understood the legalities of exchanging insurance details after
an accident, and though he had been interested in the altercation (he remembered turning
music down in the car to listen in), he was unable to hear what was said, other than the other
driver swearing. We updated his knowledge to include information about reporting of accidents,
along with the sharing of insurance details for the purposes of sorting out the damages and
responsibility. We used concepts he was familiar with as a means to help explain the process; so,
for example, he was aware that school kept a record of injuries sustained at school and was able
to work out that this information could be used to reduce commonly occurring accidents. In
explaining the insurance, he was aware that damage to goods in a shop required the responsible
party to pay for them; therefore, with cars costing considerably more, he was informed that
insurance was a way to cover the eventuality of an accident and subsequent costs. Once he had
integrated this knowledge, he was able to notice a reduction in his overall anxiety in the retelling
as well as a reduction in his anger levels outside of sessions.
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Figure 3. Child PTSD Symptom Scale (CPSS) scores through treatment.
Note. Clinical cutoff is a CPSS score of 11.
The final part of the narrative involved Dylan and his father arriving at his place of safety,
which he had originally assumed was home. However, because of where the incident took place
and the other driver’s anger, Dylan’s father had driven them to Dylan’s grandparents’ house. In
the updating of the narrative, Dylan’s father acknowledged that this decision reflected his desire
to report the incident, to calm himself, and for Dylan to have additional carer input to help him
manage. While at Dylan’s grandparents, Dylan’s father called the police, who were aware of the
incident because the ambulance that saw them at the scene had called it in. When the police
arrived at the accident site, the two vehicles had already departed the scene. It was very helpful
for Dylan to be able to acknowledge his father’s need to calm down. Similarly, it was helpful
for Dylan to acknowledge that his father had the same physiological response to a traumatic
event as he himself had had, but that with more life experience, his father was able to process it
and manage it slightly differently. Dylan had previously not been able to understand the police
not visiting them, so we were able to educate him about incident reporting, and the fact that
the insurance company would now deal with the situation so that no further contact with the
other driver was required. In fact, the police had driven to the other driver’s house and had
seen the damage to his van; they also confirmed that the other driver was admitting liability and
informed Dylan’s father of this on the telephone while Dylan was in school.
Finally, we were able to update Dylan as to the progress of the insurance claim and the fact
that the case was essentially closed from an insurance perspective. Dylan’s father brought in a
letter from the insurance company detailing the liabilities and explained that a payment had
been received for the damage to the car, but compensation for personal injuries had not yet
been finalized. Although Dylan was not able to read and understand all of this, it was tangible
evidence of the process and it was agreed that when final payments were made, Dylan’s father
would let him know as a further update. All of this information was integrated into Dylan’s
narrative of the event as illustrated earlier.
Outcome and Prognosis
Dylan worked very hard throughout his sessions and made good progress. Dylan’s scores on a
0–10 Likert scale of distress during recounting the narrative had decreased as he had progressed
with the process. He had indicated peak scores of 10 when discussing his physical pain, at the
first recounting, and 8 when his father had got out of their car. However, by the end of the
narrative sessions, he was not registering any discomfort or anxiety when reading through the
narrative, talking about, or thinking about the trauma. He was reporting scores of 0 throughout
these final sessions at all parts of the narrative. Dylan’s scores also decreased on the Child PTSD
SymptomScale (CPSS; Foa, Johnson, Feeny,&Treadwell, 2001), from26 at session 1 to 0 around
session 5 and continuing at this level through to the his last session, following the trajectory
shown in Figure 3.
522 Journal of Clinical Psychology: In Session, May 2017
At baseline, at the clinical interview, Dylan’s father endorsed PTSD symptoms for Dylan of
intrusions and reenactment in play, distress at reminders of the trauma, inability to recall details
of the accident, negative beliefs, negative emotions, loss of interest, difficulty initiating sleep,
irritability/anger, recklessness, concentration difficulties, and hypervigilance. At posttreatment,
Dylan no longer met criteria for PTSD. The only endorsed PTSD symptom was distress at
reminders of the trauma, and this was specifically reported as being concern over the presence
of vans similar to the one involved in the accident.
Summary
This case study demonstrates that the classic symptom cluster of PTSD can be seen in young chil-
dren, that they can identify and work through their trauma narrative, and that they can update
their memories and misappraisals using a cognitive methodology. More specifically, this case
illustrates the application of the CBT-3M approach to treating PTSD in very young children.
It demonstrates qualitatively that young children are able to work cognitively, using develop-
mentally appropriate techniques as outlined, to address inconsistencies and inaccuracies in their
memories. They are able to confront distressing and painful memories while acknowledging
stress reduction and less emotional demand as they do so.
It is hoped that the clinical trial (Dalgleish et al., 2015) of CBT-3M in this age group will add
significantly to the literature in terms of our understanding of how children develop PTSD after
trauma, provide preliminary support for an efficacious treatment, and support our understand-
ing of the cognitive model and its application to young children.
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